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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
Nos. 08-3802, 08-3863
___________
ARIEL LAND OWNERS, INC.
v.
LORI DRING; NANCY ASARO, 
                                  Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs
v.
ARIEL LAND OWNERS, INC.; *LAKE PROPERTY OWNERS, 
  Counterclaim Defendants 
Lori Dring; Nancy Asaro, 
Appellants at No. 08-3802
   *(Amended per Clerk's Order of 10/24/08)
_____________
ARIEL LAND OWNERS, INC.
v.
LORI DRING; NANCY ASARO, 
                                 Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs
v.
ARIEL LAND OWNERS, INC.; *LAKE PROPERTY OWNERS,
     Counterclaim Defendants
2        Ariel Land Owners, Inc.; Karl R. Iffland;
        Alice L. Iffland; Lake Property Owners,
                                     Appellants at No. 08-3863
     *(Amended per Clerk's Order of 10/24/08)
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 3-01-cv-00294)
District Judge:  The Honorable A. Richard Caputo
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 2, 2009
Before: McKEE, CHAGARES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: March 15, 2010)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from the January 18, 2008 judgment of the District Court
resolving a dispute over title to a strip of land bordering on, and land beneath, a lake in
Pennsylvania.  Because our opinion is wholly without precedential value, and because the
parties and the District Court are familiar with its operative facts, we offer only an
abbreviated recitation to explain why we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
3Both parties, appellants Lori Dring and Nancy Asaro (“Dring”), and appellee Ariel
Land Owners, Inc., assert chains of title which allegedly give them rights to the same strip
of land bordering a lake.  Ariel’s ownership of the lake is also at issue.  This case is
unique and complex because of attenuated chains of title.  Additionally, the property lines
depend to some degree on the water line of the lake, which fluctuates seasonally between
1423.5 feet to 1425.9 feet above sea level by operation of a man-made dam at the end of
the lake. 
I.
Dring first claims that the District Court was compelled to grant a Rule 52(c)
motion to dismiss the case at the close of Ariel’s case-in-chief.  Dring argues that Ariel
did not provide sufficient evidence to describe and prove the boundaries of the land
claimed.  Rule 52(c) clearly gives the court broad discretion on the timing of its judgment. 
We disagree that the District Court was under any such compulsion to rule before it heard
all of the evidence from both parties.  Given the complexity of this case and the intricate
analysis of evidence required here, the District Court was well within its discretion to
deny the Rule 52 motion to dismiss at the close of Ariel’s case-in-chief.
Similarly, we do not find any merit in Dring’s assertion that the District Court was
required to insert two of its factual findings into the judgment that it issued.  Dring
initially complains that the judgment should have stated that Ariel did not own the lake by
deed.  The issue at bar, however, was title to the lake.  The District Court found that
4Ariel’s ownership of the lake could not be established by record title, but could be found
on the basis of adverse possession.  Accordingly, the Court rendered judgment, stating: 
“Judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of Ariel Land Owners, Inc. and against Lori
Dring and Nancy Asaro as to title by adverse possession of Lake Ariel and Mud Pond to a
level of 1423.5 feet above sea level.”  This language definitively resolves the issue at bar.
Therefore the District Court properly denied Dring’s Motion seeking emendation of the
judgment.
Similarly, Dring complains that the judgment should specifically detail the low
water level as 1423.5 feet above sea level, and the high water level as 1425.9 feet above
sea level.  The judgment states: 
Judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of Lori Dring and
Nancy Asaro and against Ariel Land Owners, Inc. as to record
title of the South Strip of 2.4 feet, the difference between the
natural water level of Lake Ariel and Mud Pond, and the high
water mark of same. 
The judgment also concludes: “Judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of Ariel Land
Owners, Inc. and against Lori Dring and Nancy Asaro as to a prescriptive easement in the
South Strip of 2.4 feet to a level of 1425.9 feet above sea level.”  We find these
statements to be sufficiently clear.  The District Court did not err in denying Dring’s
motion to reconsider.
Next, Dring challenges the District Court’s ruling that gave ownership of the land
under the lake to Ariel on the basis of adverse possession.  They claim that, since a prior
5settlement reduced the claims at trial to Count I of the amended complaint, the District
Court was limited to the issue of whether the deed proffered by Ariel was proof of their
ownership of the land underneath the lake.  Their characterization of Count I is simply
incorrect.  
Although Ariel explicitly noted its possession of a deed that, it maintained, proved
its ownership, Ariel also contended that it has been “in actual possession of and has
exercised dominion and control over the entire body of water commonly known as Lake
Ariel and Mud Pond . . . .”  Moreover, in Count I, Ariel sought an order giving it “fee
simple title to the property,” and it also requested “such other and further orders as are
necessary for the granting of proper relief to [Ariel] herein be made as the case may
require or as the court may deem proper.”  As Dring concedes in the brief, “a court is not
limited to granting relief to a party solely on the basis of theories of recovery set forth in
the pleadings.”  We find that Count I was sufficiently broad to place Dring on notice that
adverse possession was a possible means by which Ariel would assert title to the land
under the lake in Count I.  The District Court properly considered and rendered judgment
on this basis.
Dring also challenges the substance of the District Court’s adverse possession
ruling.  The District Court concluded that, since 1964, Ariel maintained actual,
continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct and hostile possession of the land under
the lake.  The District Court cited primarily to undisputed evidence that, throughout this
Dring and Asaro point to testimony by Ariel’s lake manager that his activity dated1.
only to 1989, and also to his statements that Ariel did not ever believe it owned the body
of water known as “Mud Pond.” However, the record demonstrated Ariel’s control of the
water level for seventy-six years.  Moreover, the District Court’s ruling that Lake Ariel
and Mud Pond were one body of water eliminates the significance of testimony focused
upon that portion of the lake.  
Similarly, Dring and Asaro’s reference to Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp2.
Ass’n, 200 A. 646 (Pa. 1938); Camp Chicopee v. Eden, 154 A. 305 (Pa. 1931); Shaffer v.
Baylor’s Lake Ass’n, 141 A.2d 583 (Pa. 1958); and Loughran v. Matylewicz, 81 A.2d 879
(Pa. 1951) are unavailing because all of them focus upon fact patterns of “occasional use”
of property.  While Flickenger v. Huston, 435 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. 1981) involves more
than occasional use, it is distinguished by its focus upon landed property.  Continuous
(continued...)
6
time, Ariel controlled the water level of the lake by operating a dam that seasonally raised
and lowered the water by roughly 2.4 feet.   The District Court also took note of evidence
that Ariel had the reputation among residents at the lake of being the owner of the lake. 
The District Court rejected this evidence as proof of its ownership of the strip of land that
was seasonally flooded, but stated that the testimony was convincing on the issue that
Ariel controlled the water level “legitimately.” We do not find any error in either finding.  1
Moreover, Dring has not produced, nor did our own research reveal any
controlling state precedent on point that would undermine the District Court’s legal
conclusion on adverse possession.  Dring’s reference to Costello v. Harris, 29 A. 874 (Pa.
1894) is misplaced.  This case actually supports the District Court’s finding that Ariel did
not own the disputed strip of land, but that it did have a prescriptive easement by virtue of
the seasonal flooding.  Costello is silent on whether the continuous control of the water
level of a lake constitutes evidence of adverse possession of the land beneath the lake.  2
(...continued)2.
control of the water level of an entire lake is qualitatively distinct.     
7
For these reasons, we find that the District Court properly concluded that Ariel held title
to the land under the lake by adverse possession. 
Dring next challenges the District Court’s ruling that a body of water referred to as
“Mud Pond” was distinct from Lake Ariel.  As a factual matter, the District Court
concluded that their assertion of a separate body of water is unsupported in any of the
relevant deeds in the chains of title submitted by the parties.   Moreover, our review of the
record makes it obvious that the District Court employed considerable effort in culling
through a wide array of evidence, including an on-site boat tour.  
Although the classification of a body of water is a mixed question of fact and law,
the weight of the decision on this issue is factual.  Accordingly, we give great deference
to the District Court’s conclusion in this regard.  We have not found any evidence that
would lead us to conclude that the District Court misperceived the record or improperly
applied the law in reaching its judgment, and on this basis we conclude that the District
Court did not err.
Finally, with regard to an easement held by Dring to the lake, the District Court
properly concluded that record evidence is simply insufficient to support such a claim. 
II.
8With regard to Ariel’s cross appeals, we do not find any merit in their assertions. 
The District Court properly concluded that Ariel’s ownership of land underneath the lake
did not extend beyond the lowest water level of 1423.5 feet.  We do not find any evidence
to compel a different factual conclusion from that reached by the District Court
concerning the lack of proof of ownership of this strip of land in the chains of title
presented to the court.  Additionally, as we noted earlier, Pennsylvania precedent makes it
clear that occasional intentional flooding of certain property is not, of itself, sufficient to
establish ownership of that property.  Costello, 29 A. 874.  We also cannot stretch the
reputational evidence to suffice as proof of ownership.  For these reasons, we do not find
any error in the District Court’s decision.  
We also agree with the District Court that, beginning with the deed to Joel Jones,
dated January 21, 1862, it is clear that the strip of land that is the subject of the present
litigation was reserved to Edward W. Weston, and that ownership of this strip can be
traced to the deed held by Dring and Asaro.  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in
concluding that Dring and Asaro hold, by record deed, title to the disputed strip of land
between the high and low water marks of the lake. 
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.      
